Narrative Self: A Misguided Project
Philosophers since the time of the Buddha have offered powerful arguments for the conclusion that no such simple, enduring thing exists. Modern science gives us reason to believe that that conclusion may well be right. If that is so, then why do so many of us believe that selves exist? One important reason is the fear that abandoning our belief in the self might require us to abandon or significantly change our most cherished moral practices and institutions. Some philosophers concerned by these practical implications say that the theoretical findings of science and metaphysics are irrelevant to moral and practical lives. They argue that we have the unique capacity to create or constitute our selves through narratives. However, I argue that the enterprise of narrative self-construction is circular: it presupposes the capacities and practices it sets out to defend. In addition, this enterprise is inherently conservative: in so far as it is aimed at defending our ‘ordinary’ moral practices, it limits moral progress.
Monima Chadra is Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University. She works in the philosophy of mind in the classical Indian and contemporary western traditions. Her research addresses issues at the intersection of philosophy of mind, metaphysics and ethics. Much of her recent work is concerned with offering solutions to the challenges faced by Buddhist no-self views. For example, she draws on Abhidharma-Buddhist philosophy of mind and contemporary cognitive science to provide an account of conscious experiences, in particular subjectivity and agency, without positing the existence of subjects and agents. She is also interested in how no self views explain our reactive attitudes and self-conscious emotions.
