Free

13th Annual Center for Emerging & Neglected Diseases (CEND) Symposium

Actions and Detail Panel

Free

Event Information

Share this event

Date and Time

Location

Location

VIRTUAL

245 Li Ka Shing Center, University of California at Berkeley

2353 Oxford Street

Berkeley, CA 94703

View Map

Event description
The Henry Wheeler Center for Emerging & Neglected Diseases (CEND) Annual Symposium aims to strengthen connections between scientists working

About this Event

The Henry Wheeler Center for Emerging & Neglected Diseases (CEND) Annual Symposium aims to strengthen connections between scientists working on infectious diseases of global health importance and the broader global health research, therapeutics development, and advocacy communities. The focus of the 13th Annual Symposium is: Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons Learned from COVID-19. The goal of this symposium is to provide a forum for interdisciplinary, science-based discussion to collate “lessons learned” and develop recommendations for future pandemic preparedness.

Tuesday, May 4th 2021

8:50 AM - 9:00 AM: Opening Remarks

Dr. Julia Schaletzky, Executive Director of the Center for Emerging and Neglected Diseases, the Immunotherapy and Vaccine Research Institute, and the Drug Discovery Center, University of California Berkeley

9:00 AM – 9:45 AM: How safe are we really? Disaster preparedness after Covid-19

Janet Napolitano, Professor of Public Policy, Goldman School of Public Policy

9:45 AM- 10:30 AM: Harold Varmus, Professor of Medicine, Weill Cornell Medicine - TBD

10:30 AM – 11:15 AM: No one is safe until everyone is safe - Development of Covid-19 testing capacity in Uganda

Isaac Ssewanyana, Director, Public Health Laboratories Uganda

11:15 AM – 12:00 PM: Using a One Health approach to chart a path out of the Pandemic Era

Dr. Jonna Mazet, Professor of Epidemiology and Disease Ecology at the UC Davis School of Veterinary Medicine and Founding Executive Director of the UC Davis One Health Institute.

12:00 PM – 12:45 PM: Large-scale serology studies

Dr. Eva Harris, Professor in the Division of Infectious Diseases and Director of the Center for Global Public Health in the School of Public Health, UC Berkeley

Dr. Lisa Barcellos, Professor of Epidemiology, the Director of the Center for Computational Biology and the Director of Undergraduate Public Health Major Program, UC Berkeley.

12:45 PM - 1:15 PM BREAK

1:15 PM – 2:00 PM: National Dialogue for Healthcare Innovation: Framework for Private-Public Collaboration on Disaster Preparedness and Response

Dr. Mark McClellan, Professor of Business, Medicine, and Policy, and founding Director of the Duke-Margolis Center for Health Policy at Duke University

2:00 PM – 2:45 PM: The COVID-19 vaccine race: importance of basic research in the success of the mRNA and adenovector vaccines

Dr. Barry Bloom, Professor of Public Health, Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health

2:45 PM – 3:45 PM: RapidFire: Academic discovery of novel Covid-19 therapeutics

Dr. Daniel Nomura, Professor of Chemistry and Professor of Molecular and Cell Biology and Nutritional Sciences and Toxicology, UC Berkeley

Dr. Anders Näär, Professor of Metabolic Biology, UC Berkeley

Dr. Julia Schaletzky, Executive Director, CEND

Dr. Aashish Manglik, Assistant Professor, Department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry, UCSF

3:45 PM – 4:15 PM: Panel discussion with speakers: Where to go from here? What are the lessons learned and how do we implement change?

4:15 PM – 4:45 PM: Working group formation & introduction, problem statement

Wednesday, May 5th 2021

9:00 AM - 11:00 AM: Working Group One Meet with Team Advisor (opening remarks, Dr. Julia Schaletzky)

9:30 AM - 11:30 AM: Working Group Two Meet with Team Advisor (opening remarks, Dr. Julia Schaletzky)

10:00 AM - 12:00 PM: Working Group Three Meet with Team Advisor (opening remarks, Dr. Julia Schaletzky)

11:00 AM - 4:30 PM: Working group hours

4:30 - 5:00 PM: Policy Proposal Presentations & Closing Remarks

Attendees will have the opportunity to participate in one of three working groups:

WORKSHOP 1: Regulatory Science and Pandemic Preparedness – towards “crisis standards of care”

In Emergency Medicine, "crisis standards of care" are well established: Doctors train ahead of time for and have protocols in place how to triage patients in case disaster strikes, ERs are overrun and providers have to quickly decide which heavily injured patient to treat first. However, for other critical elements of pandemic response, i.e. diagnostic testing, manufacturing and supply chain, no such "crisis standards of care" exist. Instead, sometimes overly cautious restrictions are in place that can severely hamper the development of testing capacity during sudden need, i.e. during a pandemic. There is no provision for a sudden increase in need for capacity, breakdown of international supply chains, or a shortage of licensed providers to order and conduct tests and communicate results. How can we use our experience with COVID-19 to inform the generation of a "crisis standard of care" for the regulatory system?

WORKSHOP 2: How to refocus research to a new threat rapidly – effective funding mechanisms and science administration to harness reserve capacity

Harnessing National research capacity and allowing investigators to study a new pathogen is a key element of finding a solution to treat and prevent disease and we have seen an unprecedented effort in the science community, including some private sector and grassroots initiatives. However, the long timelines and risk averse nature of government funding, together with the difficulty to access critical reagents and clinical samples, have slowed down the pivot to COVID-19 research. Also locally, university lab closures and administrative/compliance issues have exacerbated the problem of conducting critical COVID-19 research in a timely fashion. How can we develop systems that allow for a rapid reorientation of research effort in a situation of National need?

WORKSHOP 3: How to accelerate therapeutics development and develop sufficient high containment Drug Discovery laboratory capacity (BSL3/4)

Airborne pathogens, which are the most likely to lead to pandemic spread, require BSL3 or BSL4 containment for research work. BSL3 and BSL4 capacity, both in terms of space and trained personnel, is severely limited, largely confined to academic and government institutions, and cannot support large-scale research and Drug Discovery. In particular, few laboratories can conduct automated high throughput screening in a BSL3 environment. This capacity is very difficult to increase in a timely manner. How can we generate the necessary infrastructure for pandemic preparedness?

Share with friends

Date and Time

Location

VIRTUAL

245 Li Ka Shing Center, University of California at Berkeley

2353 Oxford Street

Berkeley, CA 94703

View Map

Save This Event

Event Saved