OWASP Cambridge Chapter meeting November 2013
Tuesday, November 12, 2013 from 5:30 PM to 8:30 PM (PST)
Cambridge, United Kingdom
San Francisco, California
London, United Kingdom
Paul Cain: Over 12 years experience working in the field of computer forensics. Cutting the bytes within law enforcement more recently within a commercial environment. Conducting investigations on digital devices, providing witness evidence in court and author / teacher of the 7Safe forensic courses.
Presentation: Tracking Data using Forensics
IP data theft is becoming more common. Many data compromises are exploited from the internal threat. Using case studies this presentation will demonstrate forensic artefacts to provide some answers to how and what data was taken.
James Forshaw: James is the Head of Vulnerability Research at Context Information Security in the UK. He has been involved with computer hardware and software security for over 10 years with a skill set which covers the bread and butter of the security industry such as application testing, through to more bespoke product assessment, vulnerability analysis and exploitation. He has numerous public vulnerabilities disclosures in many different products including web browser issues and virtual machine breakouts as well as being a Pwn2Own and Microsoft Mitigation Bypass bounty winner.
He has spoken at a number of security conferences in the past, on a range of different topics such including managed language security at Blackhat USA, CanSecWest and Bluehat, Sony Playstation Portable hacking at Chaos Computer Congress, WebGL exploitation at Ruxcon and Citrix network exploitation at Blackhat Europe. He is also the developer of the free CANAPE networking analysis and exploitation tool.
Presentation: The Forger's Art: Exploiting XML Digital Signature Implementations
Many security critical systems rely on the correct implementation of the XML Digital Signature standard for the purposes of verification and identity management. Technologies such as SAML and Web Service Security use the standard, and its sibling XML Encryption, to manage the security of these technologies. Being a standard there is, unsurprisingly, no canonical implementation for any platform or language, with so many different developments there are likely to be differences in how the standard is interpreted.
While a fair amount research has been done into the effects of the standard such as it allowing signature wrapping attacks, these tend to be exposed due to poor usages of the XML Digital Signature libraries. Comparatively little research has been undertaken in the implementations themselves, how they diverge from the standard, how they ensure security and whether there are any vulnerabilities in the implementations themselves.
This presentation is about research done against the main open and closed source implementations of XML Digital Signatures, how they can be exploited to gain remote code execution, signature verification bypass or denial of service. It will show some of the more nasty vulnerabilities found during the research including a novel attack against the built-in Java and .NET libraries which allow for trivial signature spoofing exposing any user of those implementations into accepting an invalid signature which is independent of their usage.