" rel="stylesheet">
Skip Main Navigation
Page Content
This event has ended


Concurrences Review + New York University School of Law

Friday, October 24, 2014 from 8:30 AM to 6:30 PM (EDT)

Ticket Information

Ticket Type Sales End Price Fee Quantity
Standard Registration*   more info Ended $600.00 $0.00
Concurrences Registration*   more info Ended $550.00 $0.00
NYSBA Registration*   more info Ended $500.00 $0.00
Academics/Enforcers Registration*   more info Ended $250.00 $0.00
NYU Student Registration*   more info Ended Free $0.00

Share ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: China, India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa...

Event Details

Concurrences + NYU Conference 24 Oct. 2014


Have questions about ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: China, India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa...? Contact Concurrences Review + New York University School of Law
Attendee List Sort by: Date | First Name | Last Name
Show More

When & Where

New York University School of Law
Greenberg Lounge
40 Washington Square South
New York

Friday, October 24, 2014 from 8:30 AM to 6:30 PM (EDT)

  Add to my calendar


Concurrences Review + New York University School of Law

The increasing number of competition regimes worldwide gives rise to new challenges for the antitrust enforcement on the global stage. This conference delves into the issues raised by the implementation and enforcement of antitrust rules in developing countries and offers the opportunity to discuss the hottest topics with some of the most prominent antitrust academics, enforcers, and practitioners.

All registrations include breakfast, coffees, lunch and cocktail reception. Payment must be received prior to the conference. There will be no refund after 1st October 2015. Cancellations must be received in writing; cancellation received in writing up to 2 weeks before the conference will receive a refund less 15 %. Substitutes delegates are welcome at any time. Photos will be taken at the event; attendees agree for the organizer to use these photos, unless otherwise required in writing.

 CLE Information: This program has been approved by the Board on Continuing Legal Education of the New York State for 8.0 hours of total CLE credit. All credit is both transitional and non-transitional and falls into the Areas of Professional Practice. This program is appropriate for both newly admitted and experienced attorneys.

Panel sponsors are AZB & Partners, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Compass Lexecon, King & Wood Mallesons, Qualcomm, White & Case, and Winston & Strawn.  


October 8, 2015

Mariana Tavares de Araújo (Levy & Salomão) was interviewed by Eleanor M. Fox (New York University School of Law).

Eleanor Fox: Mariana, You are a distinguished practitioner and counsellor of antitrust law in Brazil, and you were head of the Brazilian agency in charge of competition and consumer protection for a number of years.  Brazil’s antitrust agency (CADE) has been active on enforcement, both regarding mergers and anticompetitive conduct, a significant number of which have some international component to it. How often does CADE cooperate with other antitrust agencies? Is cooperation effective in your view?

Mariana Tavares: The results in this area appear to be mixed. Since Brazil’s new antitrust law entered into force in 2012, CADE has executed cooperation agreements with the antitrust agencies of China, Peru, Colombia, Russia, Japan, Ecuador, South Korea and France. These are first generation agreements that provide for technical assistance and the exchange of non-confidential information between the agencies.

While these agreements are a strong indication of how much CADE values cooperation with foreign authorities, from a practical standpoint, this has had little effect on ongoing cases. Take as example international cartel investigations. Typically, these cases involve multiple companies and individuals located in Brazil and abroad and summoning these defendants is, of course, a key step in the investigation and one for which having such agreements in place could perhaps be helpful. However, this has not been the case. It continues to be challenging for CADE to summon individuals and companies abroad through MLATs, which of course has significant impact over the investigative timeline in these cases. Similarly, for merger cases, discussions based on these agreements are necessarily limited to non-confidential information, such as market definition or theories of harm.

Read the full interview here.

October 5, 2015

Simon Roberts (University of Johannesburg) was interviewed by Susan Ning (King & Wood Mallesons).

Susan Ning: What is the role for competition in sectors where the state is active through ownership of utilities and industrial policy?

Simon Roberts: There is a well understood rationale for state ownership and investment in utilities where there are natural monopoly features in the form of scale economies which mean that the average costs of supply decline over the whole range of feasible output. There may also be extensive positive externalities which mean that private owners will under-invest. In addition, the social discount rate (the rate at which we collectively value the future) may differ from private discount rates (at which private agents can borrow). These considerations mean that there is a substantial role for the state in areas such as infrastructure, as well as for industrial policies designed to build productive capabilities.

Read the full interview here.

September 25, 2015

Dennis Davis (South African Competition Appeal Court) was interviewed by Samir Gandhi (AZB Partners).

Samir Gandhi: In July 2011 the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa approved the Walmart/Massmart transaction after the parties accepted certain behavioral remedies. Typically, competition/antitrust authorities prefer structural remedies over behavioral. Perhaps monitoring the implementation of behavioral remedies is more onerous as compared to overseeing a one time divestment (structural remedy) order. Is there a specific reason why the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa decided to impose behavioral remedies in the Walmart/Massmart transaction? 

Dennis Davis: It is correct that structural  remedies  may be a preferable  route  but in this case, on the facts, it was clear that Walmart’s merger could not be refused on cognizable  competition grounds. The question then arose as to how, if at all, a behavioral remedy could be crafted to modestly promote the public interest  grounds  that are in the legislation. This was less intrusive than a structural remedy  and had the support of the experts on both sides .

Read the full interview here.

September 16, 2015

Francis W. Kariuki (Competition Authority of Kenya) was interviewed by Eleanor M. Fox (New York University School of Law).

Eleanor Fox: Francis, you are the Director-General of the Kenya Competition Authority, which is a young agency, having become operational in 2013.  By all accounts, you have carried your agency very far in those few years, amidst all of the challenges that face a competition authority in a developing country with a huge portion of people living below the poverty line and the largest source of livelihood in the agriculture sector. Can you tell us: What do you regard as the biggest challenges competition policy enforcement poses to Kenya, and how are you meeting them?

Francis Kariuki: The biggest challenge has been to entrench the Authority in an environment where a competition culture has not deeply permeated. This is exhibited by the lack of appreciation of the workings and benefits of competition law by the business community and also presence of some government regulations which act as obstacles to effective competition. These regulations are as a result of a historical anachronism; from the era of government controls which accorded SOEs a lot of space and latitude in the management of most of the sectors of the economy. The Authority needs to establish its visibility and credibility in this scenario which demands judicious use of the ever scarce resources, in terms of human and capital. 

The other challenge, towards entrenching ourselves, is dealing with the perceptions of some international law firms and their clients. This is in reference to what I may refer to as commonality view or single entity perception in regard to the level of development of Competition Agencies in Africa. My personal view is that they believe that all competition laws in the Continent are not modern; analytical skills are missing and internal procedures of managing clients’ information/records are non-existence.   

Read the full interview here.

August 31, 2015 

Thomas Cheng (University of Hong Kong) was interviewed by Daniel Rubinfeld (New York University School of Law).


Daniel Rubinfeld: Can you give us a brief overview of how China’s competition law currently treats pharmaceutical pricing?

Thomas Cheng: China has long kept a tight rein on drug prices as part of its efforts to keep medical care affordable for its vast and aging population. The authorities have been setting prices based on the manufacturer-reported costs of producing drugs. It has also operated a drug reimbursement system that comprises an Essential Drug List (EDL) – a list of price-controlled drugs to satisfy health care needs which must be made available to the public at all times in adequate amounts and in appropriate dosage forms. The list is reviewed every three to five years.


However, in May this year China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has issued an announcement removing the price caps on most drugs (except narcotics and some listed psychotropic drugs) starting from 1 June, in the hope of establishing a market-driven drug pricing system. This follows from the recent seventh amendment to the Drug Administration Law and the removal of Article 55, which stated that pharmaceutical companies, distributors and medical institutions were required to adhere to the government's pricing mechanism. 

Read the full interview here.


  Contact the Organizer
New York, United States Events Conference Business

Please log in or sign up

In order to purchase these tickets in installments, you'll need an Eventbrite account. Log in or sign up for a free account to continue.